


# Introduction to Robust Protocols

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## Approach

- *Faults and attacks* occur in the network
- The network's user must *not* notice something wrong happened
- A *small* number of faulty components
- **Masking** approach to fault/attack tolerance

## Principle



## Problems

- Replicated input sensors may not give the same data
- Faulty input sensor or processor may not fail gracefully
- The system might not be tolerant to software bugs

## The Island of Liers and Truth-tellers

- An island is populated by two tribes
- Members of one tribe **consistently lie**
- Members of the other tribe **always tell the truth**
- Tribe members can recognize one another, but an external observer can't

## Puzzle I

- You run into a man and ask him if he is a truth-teller, but fail to hear the answer
- You inquire: "Did you say you are a truth-teller?"
- He responds: "No, I did not."
- To which tribe does the man belong ?

## Puzzle II

- You meet a woman on the island.
- What single question can you ask her to determine whether she is a liar or a truth-teller?

## Puzzle III

- You meet two people *A* and *B* on the island
- *A* says: “Both of us are from the liar tribe.”
- Which tribe is *A* from ?
- What about *B* ?

## Puzzle IV

- You meet two people, *C* and *D* on the island.
- *C* says: “Exactly one of us is from the liars tribe.”
- Which tribe is *D* from ?

## Puzzle V

- You meet two people *E* and *F* on the island
- *E* says: “It is not the case that both of us are from truth-tellers tribe.”
- Which tribe is *E* from?
- What about *F*?


## Puzzle VI

- You meet two people *G* and *H* on the island
- *G* says: “We are from different tribes.”
- *H* says: “*G* is from the liars tribe.”
- Which tribes are *G* and *H* from ?

## Puzzle VII

- You meet three people *A*, *B*, and *C*
- You ask *A*: “how many among you are truth-tellers?”, but don’t hear the answer
- You ask *B*: “What did *A* say?”, hear “one.”
- *C* says: “*B* is a liar.”
- Which tribes are *B* and *C* from?

## Puzzle VII



## The Island of Selective Liars

- Inhabitants lie consistently on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, and tell the truth on the remaining days
- You ask: "What is today?" "Tomorrow?"
- Responses: "Saturday", "Wednesday."
- What is the current day ?

## The Island of Random Liars

- A new Island has three tribes
  - truth-tellers
  - consistent liars
  - randomly lie or tell the truth
- How to identify three representants of each tribe with only three yes/no questions?

## Byzantine Generals




## Settings

- Byzantine generals are camping outside an enemy city
- Generals can communicate by sending messengers
- Generals must decide upon common plan of action
- Some of the Generals can be traitors


## Goal

- All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action
- A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt a bad plan


## Two Generals Paradox




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
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
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
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
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# Two Generals Paradox



# The Byzantine Generals Problem



# The (simple) Byzantine Generals Problem

- Generals lead  $n$  divisions of the Byzantine army
- The divisions communicate via reliable messengers
- The generals must **agree** on a plan (“attack” or “retreat”) even if some of them are **killed** by enemy spies

# Oral Model


- **A1:** Every message that is sent is delivered correctly
- **A2:** The receiver of a message knows who sent it
- **A3:** The absence of a message can be detected

# Solution?


plan: **array of** {A,R}; finalPlan: {A,R}

- 1: plan[myID] := ChooseAorR()
- 2: for all other G send(G, myID, plan[myID])
- 3: for all other G receive(G, plan[G])
- 4: finalPlan := majority(plan)


# Reliable Networks




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
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
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
## Crashing Networks




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
## Crashing Networks



# Crashing Networks



# Crashing Networks



# The Byzantine Generals Problem

- A general and  $n-1$  lieutenants lead  $n$  divisions of the Byzantine army
- The divisions communicate via messengers that can be captured or delayed
- The generals must **agree** on a plan (“attack” or “retreat”) even if some of them are **traitors** that want to prevent agreement


# The Byzantine Generals Problem

- A commanding general must send an order to his  $n-1$  lieutenants such that
  - **IC1:** all loyal lieutenants obey the same order
  - **IC2:** if the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends


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
3k+1 nodes are necessary (oral model)




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
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
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
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
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
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
3k+l nodes are sufficient (oral model)




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Written Model

- **A1-A3:** Same as before
- **A4:**
  - A loyal general's signature cannot be forged, and any alteration of the contents of his signed messages can be detected
  - Anyone can verify the authenticity of a general's signature


k+2 nodes are sufficient (written model)




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
$k+2$  nodes are sufficient  
(written model)




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
$k+2$  nodes are sufficient  
(written model)



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## Conclusion

- **Goal:** mask faults and attacks to the user
- **Basic principle:** redundancy and majority
  - not necessary to identify who misbehaves
  - most people must be reliable
  - protocols are much easier with cryptography (but how is crypto set up?)

## Pros

- Masks the faults and attacks to the user
- Natural way to cope with failures
- Many protocols are available
  - Consensus, Atomic commit, Reliable Broadcast, Renaming,...

## Cons

- Network must be properly initialized
- Global knowledge is assumed
  - size, names, maximum number of faults,...
- Global communication is used
- Global synchrony is assumed